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Given a program that has access to some private information, how can we ensure 
that it does not improperly leak the information? We formali:i:;e the desired security 
property as a property called noninterference. We discuss versions of noninterference 
appropriate for multi-threaded programs with probabilistic scheduling and describe 
rules for ensuring noninterference. 
1 Introduction 
Ensuring the privacy of information is a major problem today, made both 
more pressing and more difficult by the enormous growth of the Internet. In 
this paper, we address one aspect of this problem: given a program I' that has 
access to some private information, how can \Ve prevent I' from leaking the 
information? (This problem was called the confinement problem. by Lampson 
[6], who first raised the issue in the early 1970s.) \Ve will focus in particular 
on the case when P is multi-threaded. 
The difficulty of preventing a program P from leaking private information 
depends greatly on what kinds of observations of P are possible. If ·we can 
1 This material is based upon activities supported by the National Science Foundation 
under Agreements Number CCH-9612176 and CCR-9612345. 
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Fig. 1. A Tax Return Applet 
make e:r:ternal obsernation.s of P 's running time. memory usage, and so forth, 
then preventing leaks becomes very difficult. For example, P could modulate 
its running time in order to encode the private information. Furthermore, 
these modulations might depend on low-level implementation details, such as 
paging and caching behavior. I3ut this means that it is insufficient to prove 
confinement ·with respect to an abstract semantics-every implementation de-
tail that affects running time must be addressed in the proof of confinement. 
For this reason, we 'Nill not consider such external observations further. 
If, inst.cad, we can only make internal ob.servations of P's behavior, the 
confinement problem becomes more tractable. Internal observations include 
the values of program variables, together with any system-provided functions 
that can be called by P. Of course, if the system provides a real-time clock, 
then running time is observable internally, and we are no better off than before. 
But in this case vve can design the system with confinement in mind, excluding 
features (like real-time clocks) that are problematic. This situation is relevant 
to the case of mobile code, \Vhich runs under the control of a host machine 
that can limit 1-vhat the code can observe. 
\Vhen only internal observations are possible, \Ve can formulate the con-
finement problem as follows [1,2]: if each program variable is classified as L 
(low, public) or H (high, private), then we wish to ensure that information 
cannot fimv from H variables to L variables. 
For example, Figure 1 suggests the behavior of a tax return applet which 
could be downloaded from a site called Trust:VIc. The applet runs on my 
machine, allmving me to complete my tax return. \Vhen I finish, the applet 
sends the completed tax return to the IRS and sends billing information back 
to Trusnfo, using encryption to protect the privacy of these communications. 
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But how do I knmv that my private financial information is not somehow 
encoded in the billing information sent back to Trusf\fo':' If I classify the tax 
return as H and the billing information as L, then I would like to knmv that 
no information can fimv from H variables to L variables. 
2 Possibilistic Noninterference 
Formally, \Ve want programs to satisfy a property called noninterference [10], 
which says that the final values of L variables don't depend on the initial 
values of H variables. In the case when programs are nmlti-threaded: and 
hence nondeterministic, we need a po88ibih,t'ic noninterference property [8], 
which says that changing the initial values of H variables cannot change the 
set of possible final values of L variables. 
Here's a non-example, similar to one in [8]. Suppose x is H: with value 
0 or 1, and y is L. Also, assume that t is initially 0. Consider the following 
program, which consists of tvw threads: 
Thread ct: 
Thread /3: 
if :r: = 1 then 
while t = 0 do sbp; 
y := 1; 
t := 1 
if :r: = 0 then 
while t = 0 do sbp; 
y := O; 
t := 1 
Note that thread ct always assigns 1 to y: and thread /3 always assigns 0 to y: 
but the order in which these assignments are done depends on the value of :r:. 
As a result, ·with any fair scheduler the value of :i; is copied toy. 
Suppose that we adopt a formal semantics for our multi-threaded language 
that specifies a purely nondeterministic scheduler. Such a scheduler is charac-
terized by the simple rule: 
At each step: any thread can be selected to run for a step. 
Suppose that we prove that a program P satisfies possibilistic noninterference 
\Vith respect to this scheduler. Can we conclude that P remains secure if ·we 
implement something more deterministic, such as round-robin time slicing? 
The ans·wer is no. For suppose that ~r is H, \vith value 0 or 1, y is L, and 
c is a command that doesn't alter :z: or Y: but that takes longer than a time 
slice. Consider the following program: 
Thread 0:: 
Thread /3: 
if x = 1 then (c: c); 
y := 1 
c; 
y := () 
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\Vith respect to the purely nondeterministic scheduler, this program satisfies 
possihilistic noninterference: regardless of the initial value of :r, the final val uc 
of y can be either 0 or 1. But under round-robin time slicing, the value of 
x is al ways copied to y. Thus vve see that noninterference is not a safety 
property-it is not closed under trace subset.ting. 
3 Probabilistic Noninterference 
A purely nondeterministic scheduler is convenient in a formal semantics, hut 
it is unclear how such a scheduler might he implemented; it seems to require 
an "erratic daenwn'' . 2 
\Ve might consider a probabilistic implementation that flips coins to select 
the thread to run in the next step. But note that this moves us from a nonde-
terministic semantics, in which events are either poss'ible or impossible, to a 
probabili8tic sernantics, in which events have a probability of occurring. Still, 
\Ve can say that this gives an implementation of the purely nondeterministic 
scheduler, if we are \Villing to equate "possible" vvith "occurs \vith nonzero 
probability". 
I3ut nmv suppose that .r is H, with value between 1 and 100, and y is 
L. Suppose that random(lOO) returns a random number between 1 and 100. 
Consider the follmving program: 
Thread a: y := ;T 
Thread ;3: y := rnndom(lOO) 
This program satisfies possibilistic noninterference: regardless of the initial 
value of :r, the final value of y can be any number bebvecn 1 and 100. But 
with a probabilistic semantics, this is not good enough, because the final values 
of ya.re not equally likely. In particular, if we can run the program repeatedly, 
we expect the final values of y to look something like 
75,22,12,22,22,93,4,22, ... 
allowing us to conclude (in this case) that :r is probably 22. Thus \VC sec that 
possibilistic noninterference is not sufficient to prevent probabilistic informa-
tion flO"ws. :~ Instead, we now need a probabih,t'ic non'irtterference property, 
which says that changing the initial values of H variables cannot change the 
joint distribution of possible final values of L variables [9]. In the next section, 
\Ve develop this idea more formally. 
~ The term is due to Dijbtra. [3]. 
:~ This observation can be credited to :\kLcan [7] and \Vittbold and .Johnson [11]. 
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4 Multi-Threaded Programs as Markov Chains 
\Ve assume that threads are ·written in a simple imperative language: 
c ::= skip 
~r := e 
if e then c1 else c2 
while e doc 
Integers are the only values: \Ve use 0 for false and nonzero for true. \Ve assume 
that all expressions arc pure and total, and that expressions arc executed 
a. tomicall y. 
Programs arc executed ·with respect to a. single shared memory fl, which is 
a. map from identifiers to integers. \Ve extend this to a map from expressions 
to integers, writing p,( e) to denote the value of expression c in memory p. 
The scmanties of commands is given by a standard transition semantics 
-----+ on configurations ( c, 11) or /L The rules a.re given in Figure 2. 
A multi-threaded program is modeled by an object map 0 that maps 
thread identifiers (cv, {3, ... ) to commands. The semantics of multi-threaded 
programs is given via global transitions b on global configurations ( 0, p,). 
The three rules are 
(cLOBAL) O(a) = c 
( c, p )-----+ p/ 
p = 1;101 
(0, p)~(O - n; 1/) 
O(a) = c 
(c, p)-----+(c', 1/) 
p = 1/[0[ 
(0, p)k(O[a := c'], 1/) 
l 
( { } 1 11) ==::::;. ( { } ' p,) 
The first and second rules deal \vi th a. nonempty set of threads; the third deals 
with an empty set of threads. I\ote that V>'e are assuming a uniform scheduler, 
that selects each thread in 0 \vith equal probability. 
\Vith these definitions; a program 0 executing in memory /L is a Markov 
chain [4]. The states of the .Markov chain are all the global configurations 
reachable from the initial state ( 0, fl) under k, and the transition matrix T 
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(.skip,µ.)---+ 11 
(UPDATE) 
( SEQUE'JCE) ( c,' µ.)---+ p/ 
( c 1, µ.)---+ ( c~, µ.') 
(BRANCH) 
µ(e) = () 
(woP) µ(e) = () 
(while e do c, p,)---+11, 
µ ( e) nonzero 
(while e do c,p,)---+(c;while e do c,p) 
Fig. 2. Sequential Transition Semantics 
is given by 
It is now useful to define a probabilistic state u to be a (discrete) probability 
distribution on the set of global configurations [5]. Concretely, u is a rmv vector 
with unit sum. \Vith this vie·wpoint, ·we can model the execution of 0 under 
memory µ as a deterrnini.'Jtic sequence of probabilistic states: 
Uo, '111, ll2, 'U-3, · · · 
where 'llo is the distribution that assigns probability 1 to ( 0, 11) and 0 to 
all other configurations, and uk+i = ukT. \\'e can nmv write a very simple 
expression for the kth probabilistic state: vk = u 0Tk. 
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For example, consider the program 
() = { ~1t: ~~ile l = 0 do skip } 
,3. l .- 1 
executed in a memory that sets l to 0 initially. There arc a total of five 
reachable states in the :\Iarkov chain: 
. ( { a ... ·: while l = 0 do skip} ·- ) 
<11 . , [l .- O] 
/J : (l := 1) 
q2 : ({ct: while l = 0 do sk'ip}, [l := 1]) 
Qa. , [Z .- OJ . ( { ct: skip; while l = 0 do skip } ·- ) 
/3 : ( l := 1) 
q4 : ({a: skip; while l = 0 do skip}, [l := 1]) 
<10: ({ } , [l := 1]) 
The transition matrix T for this program is as follows: 
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
<11 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 
<12 0 0 0 0 1 
q;) 1/2 0 0 1/2 0 
q1 0 1 0 0 0 
q5 () () () () 1 
For instance, we get the first row of T by noting that running thread a from 
state q1 takes us to state q3 , and running thread /3 takes us to state q2 . Thus, 
under our uniform scheduling assumption, we go from q1 either to q2 or to q3 , 
each with probability 1/2. 
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In terms of probabilistic states, the initial distribution n0 is (1 0 0 0 0). 
And we can trace the probabilistic states that 0 passes through: 
<11 <12 <];{ <]4 <Jr, 
Uo 1 0 0 0 0 
·u0 T 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 
Uo y2 1/4 () () 1/4 1/2 
Uo T3 () 3/8 1/8 () 1/2 
Uo T4 1/16 0 0 1/16 7/8 
noT5 0 3/32 1/32 0 7/8 
uoT6 1/64 0 0 1/64 31/32 
Of course, 0 will converge to the probabilistic state (0 0 0 0 1). 
l\ow, to formalize the probabilistic noninterference property, \Ve need to 
define a notion of equivalence on probabilistic states. Ti) this end, ·we say 
that probabilistic states u and u' are equivalent, \Vritten u rv u', if they are 
equal after H variables are projected out. Intuitively, u and u' agree about 
everything except the values of H variables. For example, if x is H and y is 
L, then 
is equivalent to 
{ 
(0, [.r :~ 0, !J :~OJ) : 1/2, } 
(0, [:z: :=Ly:= OJ) : 1/2 
{(O, [:r: := 2,y :=OJ): 1}, 
since in both cases the result of projecting out x is 
{(O, [y :=OJ): l}. 
Finally, \Ve can give the formal definition of probabilistic noninterference: 
Definition 4.1 Program 0 satisfies probabilistic noninterference if for all 
probabilistic states u and u', u rv u' implies uT rv u'T. 
This definition gives us \vhat we want, for suppose that we execute a pro-
gram 0 under two memories 11 and 1/ that agree on the values of L variables. 
Then 
{(O,µ.): 1} rv {(0,1/): 1} 
and hence 
{(O, µ.): l}Tk rv {(O, 1/): l}Tk 
for all k. That is, the two executions proceed in probabilistic lockstep. 
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5 Ensuring Probabilistic Noninterference 
\Ve can perform a static analysis that ensures that a program 0 satisfies 
probabilistic noninterference. The analysis is described formally (as a type 
system) in [9]; here we give an intuitive presentation as a set of rules. The 
rules impose constraints on assignments, while loops, and if statements: 
• For an assignment, y := e, the rule is that if y is L, then e must contain no 
H variables. 
• For a while loop, while e do c~ the rule is that e must co11tain no H 
variables. 
• For an if statement, if e then c else c', the rule is that if e contains an~y 
H variables, then 
(i) c and c' must contain no assignments to L variables, 
(ii) c and c' must contain no while loops, and 
(iii) the entire if statement must be protected, so that it executes atomically. 
For the last rule, \Ve introduce a new command, protect c, whose seman-
tics is given by 
(ATOMlClTY) (r;, p)----+* /1,' 
(protect c, p,)----+1/ 
That is, if ( c, ft) can reach p/ in one or more steps, then (protect c, 11) can 
reach 1/ in exactly one step. 
Applying these rules to the first program of Section 2, ·we see that the 
program is illegal, because both threads have while loops within the bodies of 
if statements whose guards are H. And for the second program of Section 2 to 
be legal, the if statement of thread a needs to be protected: this \vill mask the 
amount of time needed to execute it , thereby eliminating the timing channel. 
Of course, our rules a.re necessarily conservative. rdorc experience is needed 
to determine how burdensome they a.re in practice. 
It can be shown that any program () that satisfies the above rules satisfies 
probabilistic noninterference. Details can be found in [9]; here we sketch pa.rt 
of the argument. 
First. we can show probabilistic noninterference for point masses; that is, 
for distributions in which some configuration has probability 1 and all others 
have probability 0: 
Theorem 5.1 rf 0 satisfi,es the above rules and 1, ,...._, i,') where t and t' are 
point masses, then i,T""""' t'T. 
Then we can extend the result to arbitrary distributions by exploiting the 
linearity of T: 
Lemma 5.2 If 'lli ,...._, n~ ) for all i) then 
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Lemma 5.3 If n rv n', then there exist coefficients c 1, c 2, C;~ , ... and point 
masses 1. 1 , 1,2 , /,;{, ... and 1,;, 1.~, L'.1, ... wdh 1,i ""'1,~ for all i, such that 
U = C1l·1 + C2l·2 + C;~/,;{ + · · · 
and 
Corollary 5 .4 If 0 satisfies the above rules and n rv u', then uT rv n'T. 
Proof. Since T is a continuous linear transformation, 
nT = (c1t1 + c21·2 + C;{l.3 + · · ·)T 
= c1 (1,1 T) + c2(1.2T) + c3(l3T) + · · · 
rv c1 (1.~ T) + c2(t;T) + c:3(r'.{T) + · · · 




To develop secure computer systems, it is first necessary to identify the precise 
security properties of interest. \Ve have presented one such property, proba-
bilistic noninterference, aimed at protecting information privacy and we have 
described rnlcs sufficient to guarantee it; our hope is that such rules provide 
a. ha.sis for constructing provably-secure systems in practice. 
References 
[1] Dorothy Denning. Secure Information Flow in Computer Systems. PhD thesis, 
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, May 1975. 
[2] Dorothy Denning and Peter Denning. Certification of programs for secure 
information flow. Communications of the ACM, 20(7):504-513, 1977. 
[3] Edsger Dijkstra. A Discipline of Programming. Prentice Hall, 1976. 
[4] William Feller. An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, 
volume I. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , third edition, 1968. 
[5] Dexter Kollen. Semantics of probabilistic programs. Journal of Computer and 
System Sciences, 22:328-350, 1981. 
[6] Butler W. Lampson. A note on the confinement problem. Communications of 
the ACM, 16(10):613 615, 1973. 
[7] John McLean. Security models and information fiow. In Proceed·ings 1990 IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 180-187, Oakland, CA, 1990. 
10 
SMlTH At\D VOLl'At\0 
[8] Geoffrey Smith and Dennis Volpano. Secure information fiow in a multi-
threaded imperative language. In Proceedings 25th Symposium on Principles 
of Programming Languages, pages 355-364, San Diego, CA, .January 1998. 
[9] Dennis Volpano and Geoffrey Smith. Probabilistic noninterference rn a 
concurrent language. Journal of Computer Securdy, 1999. To appear. 
[10] Dennis Volpano, Geoffrey Smith, and Cynthia Irvine. A sound type system for 
secure flow analysis. Journal of Computer Security, 4(2,3):167-187, 1996. 
[11] .J. Todd Wittbold and Dale M . .Johnson. Information fiow in nondeterministic 
systems. In Proceedings 1990 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 
144-161, Oakland, CA, May 1990. 
11 
